Ratings are subject to the impossible duality of being both accurate and stable. Using a simple structural credit risk model, we investigate the trade-off between rating accuracy and stability by comparing two competing approaches: point-in time (PIT) and through-the-cylce (TTC) ratings. We find that while TTC are initially more stable, they are prone to rating cliff effects and they suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults. However, when using a large sample of bank's internal TTC ratings obtained from the Global Credit Data Consortium (GCD), we instead find the opposite result: more stable ratings are, on average, more accurate. This finding obtains across different asset classes and is further robust to the inclusion of industry, geographical and time-fixed effects. * An early IMF Working Paper version also included Liliana Schumacher (lschumacher@imf.org) as one of the coauthors. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. We thank Laura Kodres for valuable feedback.
Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) face a difficult tradeoff between accuracy and stability when assigning credit ratings. On one hand, their ratings should provide the most accurate estimate of the corresponding default risk of the underlying asset while users also prefer that they do not change too frequently (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Cantor and Mann, 2006) . This is due to the fact that credit ratings are often used in fixed income portfolio composition and collateral acceptability guidelines, in bond covenants and other financial contracts, and various financial rules and regulations.
CRAs typically assign ratings using a Through the Cycle (TTC) approach. This methodology requires a long-term perspective, yet there is no precise underlying definition. For example, Altman and Rijken (2004) find that the long-term horizon only explains part of the observed rating stability and suggest that a prudent migration policy is the more important factor underlying the TTC methodology. 1 Similarly, Loeffler (2005) investigates the behavior of CRAs to deteriorating credit quality and argues that the slow reaction can be explained by a desire to avoid subsequent rating reversals. A complementary view is that the long-term default risk prediction is subject to an explicit stress test and that ratings are only updated if this stress scenario is breached (Carey and Hrycay, 2001; Loeffler, 2004) . 2 The academic literature is consistent with evidence from the CRAs themselves. In a special comment to Moody's rating users, Cantor and Mann (2006) analyze the tradeoff between ratings accuracy and stability and argue that CRAs desire to deliver both accurate and stable ratings. Also, Standard and Poor's claim that "when assigning and monitoring ratings, we consider whether we believe an issuer or security has a high likelihood of experiencing unusually large adverse changes in credit quality under conditions of moderate stress. In such cases, we would assign the issuer a lower rating than we would have otherwise." 3 Further examples relating to the agencies' practices can be found in Cantor and Mann (2003) .
The objective of this paper is to provide a detailed investigation of the trade-off between rating accuracy and stability that arises under the TTC methodology. Using a simple contingent claims model, 1 Altman and Rijken (2006) also investigate the conflicts of interests arising from the CRA's often competing objectives of providing ratings that are timely, stable, and accurate predictors of defaults. Using credit scoring models, they show that CRAs focus on the permanent credit risk component when assigning ratings. Besides, they argue that CRAs are slow in adjusting their ratings and that the slow reaction is the most important source of rating stability.
2 Topp and Perl (2010) investigate actual corporate ratings assigned by Standard and Poor's and show that even though the CRAs claim to only focus on the permanent risk component, actual ratings reveal cyclical patterns.
3 For more details see Adelson et al. (2010) .
we first compare rating dynamics of the TTC approach to a benchmark under which ratings reflect the latest information (henceforth referred to as a point-in-time, or PIT, methodology). In the second part of the paper, we then investigate rating dynamics for a large and novel sample on bank's internal TTC credit ratings, which we also descriptively compare to a small hand-collected sample on external credit ratings.
The model set-up follows Loeffler (2004) and assumes that the market value of an asset consists of both a permanent and a cyclical component. Future asset values are then subject to a stress scenario on this cyclical component when forecasting future asset values. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate discrete credit ratings into the modelling framework and then assess the implications for rating stability and accuracy. 4 Doing so, we are able to show that TTC ratings are initially more stable, yet they are prone to rating cliff effects and they suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults.
Our empirical analysis uses a novel and large dataset on bank's internal TTC ratings and thereby disentangles the effect of the TTC rating methodology itself from the documented incentive of CRAs to avoid rating changes (Carey and Hrycay, 2001; Altman and Rijken, 2004; Loeffler, 2004 Loeffler, , 2005 . The data is provided by Global Credit Data Consortium (GCD) and contains TTC ratings of 15 different global banks which are submitted for individual borrowers on (at least) a yearly basis. The final dataset includes as many as 3,382,345 counter-party observations over which subsequent rating migration matrices are observed. We provide a detailed explanation of the database and our sample in Section 4.
Rating dynamics have been shown to differ across asset classes (Cornaggia et al., 2017) , and we accordingly present all of our findings separately for large corporates, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), banks and sovereigns. We find that TTC estimates of default probabilities are consistent across asset classes, yet ratings are most accurate for large corporates and SMEs, whereas the performance is more modest for banks. For sovereigns, actual ratings slightly outperform a random technology. In addition, there is substantial variability in the accuracy of ratings (within asset classes) both over time and across banks and industries. We then explicitly investigate the relation between rating accuracy and stability and show that more stable ratings are on average more accurate. This finding obtains for all four asset classes and is robust to the inclusion of several control variables.
Our empirical findings allow for different possible interpretations. For example, the sample of bank internal ratings may be less sticky than those of CRAs. After all, it is well known that CRAs regularly employ rating reviews and outlooks to convey more timely information (Chung et al., 2012) . 5 Internal ratings, on the other hand, can be immediately updated without the need for communicating the information first using rating reviews. 6 Relatedly, a more extreme interpretation of the results is that bank internal ratings exhibit PIT dynamics, which mitigates the likelihood of rating cliff effects and therefore results in a positive relation between stability and accuracy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section (2) presents a simple structural credit risk model and explains how asset values are mapped into credit ratings under both rating approaches.
Section (3) presents the main simulation analysis, Section (4) the empirical analysis and Section (5) concludes.
The Model
The structural credit risk model used in this section follows the previous literature which introduced mean reversion into a classical Merton model (Merton, 1974; Fama and French, 1988) and, in particular, Loeffler (2004) . It models the asset value of an entity (which can be broadly thought of as either a firm or a sovereign) and assumes that it can be decomposed into a permanent and a cyclical component, i.e.
where x t denotes the logarithm of the observed asset value, x * t the permanent (fundamental) value and y t captures the cyclical component. For the fundamental value, we assume that x * t follows a random walk with drift, so that
where µ is the drift rate, σ the volatility and W t is a standard Wiener process. Note that dW = √ dt where N (0, 1) and dt denotes the length of the time step. In order to introduce cyclicality into the 5 For Moody's, every second rating action in the 2002 to 2010 period corresponds to putting an issuer on a rating watchlist. 6 Note that rating reviews not only reflect investor demand for timely information, but also serve as a successful incentive mechanism device. The explicit threat of a rating downgrade particularly incentivizes low rated issuers to take preventive action which further translates into negative abnormal stock returns in case a rating downgrade actually happens. (Boot et al., 2006; Bannier and Hirsch, 2010; Chung et al., 2012) .
value of the asset, it is assumed that y t follows an autoregressive process of order one, i.e.
where 0 < ρ < 1, u t N (0, σ 2 u ) and Cov( t , u t ) = 0. Having specified the dynamics of the fundamental and cyclical component, allows one to compute the expected value of the asset value for any final time T
where t < T . In this (so-called) contingent claims analysis framework, a default occurs when the value of an entity's assets falls through a distress threshold which is related to its liabilities. 7 Prior to default, default risk is measured in terms of distance to default -the number of standard deviations the asset value has to drop before it hits the distress threshold. The larger the distance to default, the smaller is the probability of default.
Default probabilities will differ under the two methodologies (PIT vs TTC). Under the PIT rating approach, default probabilities are simply given by the distance to default. Proposition 1 summarizes the computation.
Proposition 1 Under a PIT rating approach, distance to default for a forecasting horizon of s periods is computed as follows
where d is the face value of the liabilities and σ(x) is the volatility of the observed value x t . 8 7 In the case of a sovereign, assets include foreign reserves and fiscal assets such as the present value of taxes and other revenues, and liabilities include base money, public debt (local and foreign currency), and guarantees (explicit and implicit). See Gray et al. (2007) .
8 Following Loeffler (2004) , the unconditional variance of the observed asset value is given by V AR(xt−xt−s) = sV AR( t)+ In order to compute risk metrics under the TTC approach, we need a formal definition of what the through the cycle concept actually means.
Definition 1 TTC rating is defined as a two step process. Ex-ante ratings are calculated conditional on a stress scenario for the cyclical component. Ex-post rating changes are smoothed and thus not adjusted immediately.
To incorporate the intuition of Definition 1 into our framework, we follow Loeffler (2004) and Carey and Hrycay (2001) who argue that the worst case scenario is based on an estimate of the borrower's default probability in a stress scenario, i.e.
where p(D) is the unconditional default probability, p(D|S) is the probability of default in the stress scenario and p(S) is the probability of the stress scenario. We then calculate the prediction interval of a v-period forecast for an autoregressive process and obtain that the lower bound for the cyclical value component is thus given by 9
where Φ −1 is the inverse cumulative normal distribution function. The intuition behind the prediction interval is similar to the Value-at-Risk concept, i.e. it delivers a point estimate for the cyclical component which will only be breached with a probability of p(S). Note that the length of the TTC forecast typically exceeds the PIT forecasts, i.e. v > s, given that an attempt is made to forecast "through-the-cycle".
Combining all of the above, one can compute the expected value of the underlying asset in the case where a stress scenario is imposed on the cyclical component which leaves us with the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under a TTC rating approach, distance to default for a forecasting horizon of v periods is computed as follows
where S(x t+v ) denotes the stress-tested forecasted value of the asset
Our analysis departs from Loeffler (2004) in that we are interested in the subsequent dynamics of discrete credit rating ratings. This is because our focus is on the trade-off between rating stability and accuracy under the TTC framework. We therefore first compute default probabilities under both rating approaches and then map them into discrete ratings using Moody's idealized default probabilities. 10 Under the assumption that default can only occur at the end of each forecasting horizon, one can immediately calculate the corresponding default probabilities under both rating approach by simply computing
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function and i ∈ (P IT, T T C).
Proposition 3 We compute ratings by mapping the default probabilities under the individual approaches into discrete rating grades using Moody's idealized default probability table.
The motivation for analyzing the implications of the TTC approach using discrete rating grades is to provide a realistic platform from which to explore the implications of the TTC and smoothing approaches for rating stability. To formalize the second part of definition 1, we assume a very simple filtering technique which has been also discussed in a Moody's report, see Cantor and Mann (2006) .
Assumption 1
We assume that once current ratings fall below those implied by the initial TTC forecast, the rating will only be updated if (i) the implied rating change is larger than a one notch downgrade and
(ii) the change is persistent.
While being simple to implement, this approach also allows us to capture the empirically documented fact that CRAs are slow in updating their ratings Rijken, 2004, 2006; Loeffler, 2005) .
Numerical Analysis
We now investigate rating dynamics under the two rating approaches. We start by presenting background information on the simulation details and proceed to separately investigate the stability and accuracy of implied credit ratings.
Simulation details
To simulate rating dynamics we need to choose initial values and parameters underlying the stochastic processes. To make sure we obtain a sufficient degree of dispersion in our simulated credit ratings, we simulate credit ratings for a grid of different initial fundamental values. As shown below in Figure 1 , the chosen grid values generate a realistic distribution of credit ratings under the TTC methodology.
For the PIT approach, the same input parameters would not help much in differentiating among different creditors when Moody's 1-year idealized default probabilities are used. In fact, approximately 45 percent of the assets would receive a AAA rating and around 75 percent would be at least AA rated, as can be seen in Figure 2 . The graphs suggest that the adoption of a TTC rating approach helps in differentiating among creditors with different exposures to the business cycle even when the PIT would fail to do so.
To assess how rating stability and accuracy differ across the two approaches, we then analyze how ratings evolve over time. Clearly, if asset values evolve according to their forecasts, there won't be any unexpected rating changes and consequently no impact on rating dynamics. We therefore assume that future asset values do not evolve according to the forecasts but instead have a realized value at a lower level. Specifically, we focus on a tail risk even for which asset value is below 5th percentile of its distribution. In other words, the realization of the observed asset value is so low such that the ex-ante probability of observing this value or lower is equal to only 5 percent. For each asset, we then compute the average value of all realizations below the 5th percentile and use it to assess the evolution of credit ratings.
Stability of Ratings
Under the PIT approach, ratings change each period if default probabilities increase sufficiently to warrant a rating change. As a consequence, the cross-sectional rating distribution changes each period. On the 8 other hand, under Assumption 1, TTC ratings are only updated if the rating change is persistent and the new rating is at least two notches below the old one. Therefore, ratings will be more sticky and cross-sectional frequency of rating changes will be lower. In fact, we find that each period there are on average 57 downgrades under the TTC methodology which is significantly less than under the PIT approach (196 downgrades). 11 Figure 3 illustrates the two cross-sectional effects. Panel A displays ratings under the PIT methodology and shows that the PIT rating distribution has already changed considerably relative to one displayed in Figure 2 . For TTC ratings, displayed in Panel B, the rating distribution still looks very similar to Figure   1 . The intuitive reason is that the stress scenarios has to be considerably breached to warrant a rating change, which in turn only affects assets with the lowest initial ratings.
An important follow-up question concerns the time series effect of rating changes under the two rating methodologies. Comparing the implications of the two rating methodologies with respect to rating stability, we (1) display rating downgrades under the PIT approach; (2) the TTC approach under the smoothing rule; and (3) show what would happen in case the rating was immediately based on the PIT methodology after the stress scenario was breached. shows that by following a smoothed TTC rating policy, the credit rating would need to be downgraded by 5 notches under the TTC approach. Specifically, the TTC rating would drop from BB-to CCC-whereas the downgrade effect is more smoothed under PIT. Importantly, ratings dynamics are also less extreme if the rating was updated to PIT after the initial pessimistic forecast was breached. While the numerical values are specific to this case, the figure generally illustrates that ratings are most volatile in the case of the PIT approach. The intuitive reason is that TTC ratings build in such a pessimistic forecast that they do not have to be downgraded as often as more optimistic PIT ratings would have to. However, as time passes the actual PIT rating eventually drops below the TTC rating which is precisely the point when the TTC approach may lead to a rating cliff effect. Unless this adjustment takes place immediately, the effect can be as large as several notches and -in theory -may even result in an immediate jump to default.
It is important to stress that this rating cliff effect does not relate to the initial stress scenario but to the second stage, i.e. the attempt to filter out the market data and the subsequent lagged reaction. If the rating was instead immediately based on the PIT approach once the initial stress scenario has been breached, then rating stability (accuracy) would have been maximized before (after) breach of the stress test level.
Predictive Power of Ratings
While rating stability is an important feature of credit ratings, they should also accurately reflect the default risk of the underlying asset. We therefore investigate how well both approaches predict future defaults by computing the Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP) for defaults taking place at the end of each year. CAP curves are used to measure how accurately ratings measure the ordinal ranking of default risk. The CAP profile is derived by comparing the cumulative proportion of defaulters predicted by a specific rating grade to the overall proportion of assets rated with the specific grade. 12
Ex ante, it is not fully clear whether the TTC or the PIT methodology delivers more accurate ratings.
On one hand, the TTC approach incorporates more pessimistic assumptions such that it could be able to better forecast defaults. On the other hand, PIT ratings are more granular for lower rated assets which by construction leads to an improved forecasting performance. Figure 5 shows the CAP under the TTC and PIT methodologies in case defaults occur at the end of the first period. It turns out that initially the TTC approach is only slightly inferior in forecasting future defaults.
To assess the performance of rating methodologies over time, we then compute the CAP for defaults occurring in subsequent periods. Figure 6 shows CAPs for periods 2, 3, 4 and 5 which are derived by comparing ratings at the beginning of the respective period to end-of-period defaults. As expected, the PIT approach performs better in period 2 (upper left) given that ratings under the TTC methodology are unaltered with respect to the previous period. Once TTC ratings are updated, as is the case in period 3 (upper right), both approaches predict future defaults roughly to the same degree. In fact, it seems that the TTC approach even provides slightly better default forecasts.
While puzzling at first, the fact that TTC downgrades reflect significant and persistent changes in the 12 More specifically, the CAP curve is derived by plotting out the cumulative proportion of entities by rating grade (starting by the lowest grade on the left) against the cumulative proportion of defaulters by rating grade. "Ideal" CAP curves look almost like vertical lines starting at the zero point on the x axis because all the defaulters should be among the lowest rated issuers. In the "random" curve, all defaults occur randomly throughout the rating distribution (admittedly an unrealistically low bar for a CRA), so it lies along the diagonal. The closer the CAP curve to the ideal curve, the better the discriminatory power of that CRA's ratings. For more on CAP curves, see Cantor and Mann (2003) .
underlying credit quality, results in a more granular rating distribution for lower quality entities which improves the performance. For subsequent periods, the PIT approach again dominates and on average performs better when predicting future defaults. The intuitive reason is that once the TTC ratings are downgraded, which by construction occurs for the worst performing assets, subsequent ratings are not updated immediately which is why ex-post the forecasting performance decreases again. The lower part of Figure 6 visualizes the corresponding results for periods 4 (left) and 5 (right).
Summing up, it can be seen that the TTC rating methodology suffers from an inferior forecasting ability relative to the PIT approach. Results suggest that this is not driven by the initial stress scenario (which makes low quality ratings less granular) but instead by the reluctance to update ratings immediately once the stress scenario has been breached. Because new information is not immediately incorporated into ratings, the forecasting ability deteriorates such that PIT ratings provide more accurate information regarding the default probability of the underlying asset.
Empirical analysis 4.1 Sample Description
We greatly acknowledge support of the Global Credit Data Consortium (GCD) in enabling this study.
The GCD was founded in 2004 by a group of European banks with the intention of sharing in-house data on corporate defaults and loss experience in the wholesale credit market. 13 The data we received from GCD contain ratings of 15 different banks which submit their ratings for individual borrowers on (at least) a yearly basis.
Because the database contains highly sensitive information, it comes with two "safety-features". First, it does not include an identifier for each borrower. Practically, however, this constraint is of minor importance as the database contains information on the subsequent rating change for each borrower.
Second, it does not include forward looking T T C estimates for each obligor but instead aggregates this information each period at the regional-industry-asset-rating level for each bank.
To give an example, we know that -in a given year and quarter, for a given geographic region, within a certain industry and for a specific asset class -Bank A has X obligors that were rated with a certain credit rating Z. For this group of rated entities (subsequently referred to as a rating bucket), we have 13 Up until 2015, the GCD was called Pan European Credit Data Consortium.
information on the total number of obligors, the average forward looking T T C probability of default as well as the rating migration matrix for all obligors over the subsequent year. The second constraint is binding as we can only relate rating-bucket-specific (as opposed to obligor-specific) estimates of default probabilities to subsequent rating performance.
Our main sample covers 15 different banks and 204,923 rating-buckets over the period from 2004 to 2014. Following the rating of each borrower (within a rating bucket) over the subsequent year, yields a total of 3,382,345 counter-party observations 14 and 60,669 defaults. 15 The average number of obligors within a rating bucket equals 14 borrowers, whereas the median is only two with substantial variation across asset classes (documented below). The underlying credit portfolio is spread across the globe: 40% of all observations relate to obligors in Northern America, 15% in Western Europe and 9% in Northern Europe.
Coverage of the database has increased significantly over the sample period. While we have data on 27,000 ratings in 2004, coverage increases by a factor of twenty to around 500,000 ratings in 2012 and 2013. The universe of rated entities includes several asset classes. For example, 64% of all borrowers are classified as small & medium sized enterprises (SME), 19% relate to large corporate borrowers (LGB), 8% to are Banks and securities firms (FIN) and, finally, 1% are ratings of Sovereigns (SOV). Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2017) document that ratings by Moody's differ substantially across rating classes along various dimensions. Similar differences may apply for our internal credit ratings dataset: corporates are more highly rated than SMEs and that the rating distribution looks more "normal" for the former group (not shown). On the other hand, bank ratings are almost distributed uniformly whereas for sovereigns the distribution is skewed towards high credit ratings. The stark differences across the four asset classes further emphasize the need for a separate analysis which is why our subsequent empirical analysis presents results separately for those four asset classes.
14 In subsequent robustness checks, we also investigate rating changes over multiple years. This increases the number of counter-party observations substantially.
15 To be precise, all of the 3,382,345 observations have a non-default rating at the beginning of the year, implying that the 60,669 defaults occur at some point over the next twelve months. Also note that this number, however, likely overstates the total number of defaults during the period given that an obligor might have defaulted on several loans from different banks. Given that we do not know the identity of the obligor, we are not able to correct for this.
Rating performance
While not reported separately, we find that TTC estimates do not differ significantly across asset classes when assigning credit ratings, which could reflect the use of a single rating technology that is applied relatively homogeneously across asset classes. Historically, most defaults (on absolute and relative scale) occurred among small and medium sized enterprises and among lower rated assets.
We start our analysis by investigating the correlation between observed default frequencies and forward looking through-the cycle estimates. Specifically, we estimate the following regression for each rating bucket
where ODF is the observed default frequency, T T C is the forward looking through-the-cycle estimate of default probabilities, region are region dummies, year are year dummies and ind are industry dummies.
Panel A of Table 2 displays corresponding coefficient estimates for the sample of large corporates.
Column (1) shows that, on average, a one percentage point (pp.) increase in the T T C probability of default is associated with a 0.51 pp. increase in the observed default frequency. This effect is robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for geography, time and industry (see columns 2 to 4). In column (5), we also include the difference between the maximum and minimum T T C probability within a rating bucket.
The inclusion does not change the magnitude of the T T C coefficient (β) and is statistically insignificant.
Turning to SMEs in Panel B, the point estimate of T T C increases to 0.75 for the full regression model (column 5). In addition, the R 2 increases from 8% (in Panel A) to 19 percent. Because TTC estimates have been shown to not differ (on average) between corporates and SMEs, this likely reflects the higher observed default frequency among the sample of SME firms. For banks (Panel C), the effect is the opposite as both the coefficient estimate of TTC and R 2 s decrease. Relatedly, there is almost no statistical relation between TTC estimates and defaults among the sample of sovereigns (Panel D).
While the regression framework suggests that TTC estimates best predict defaults for SME firms, it does not directly assess the quality of the rating technology. In other words, the regression estimates the average relation between expected and realized defaults whereas a successful rating technology only requires that defaults occur among the lowest rated assets. To address this issue, we next turn to an estimation of rating group specific accuracy ratios (ARs).
We therefore compute accuracy ratios for different rating portfolios. That is, at each point in time
we know all assigned credit ratings of a certain lender (for a given asset class within a given industry and for a given geographic region). In total, our dataset includes 78,504 such rating portfolios for all asset classes. However, ARs can only be computed if (1) there is at least one default within a rating portfolio and (2) not all assets within a rating portfolio default. In other words, some but not all assets need to default. This practical restriction reduces the final sample to 1,560 rating portfolios for the asset class large corporates. 16
While we are not allowed to display descriptive information on accuracy ratios, we use them to relate our analysis to Section 3 which suggests that more stable ratings are generally less accurate. We now attempt to test whether this relation is also reflected in the data which requires us to measure rating instability (which can not be directly observed in our dataset). Ideally, we would like to first estimate the instability of a rating bucket over a certain measurement period and subsequently test whether more instable rating buckets have a better ex-post rating performance.
Because we currently do not have this information, we measure rating instability as the standard deviation of all rating changes within a rating portfolio. 17 Our estimation therefore assumes that a higher standard deviation of rating changes within a rating portfolio is a useful approximation for the unobservable rating instability of a rating bucket..
As before, our regression controls for region, time and industry fixed effects:
where AR is the accuracy ratio, Instab is the standard deviation of rating changes within a rating portfolio, Region are region dummies, Y ear are time fixed effects and Ind are industry dummies. banks (Panel C) and sovereigns (Panel D). All four panels strongly suggest that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of rating stability and accuracy. In other words, the more stable ratings are, on average, more accurate. This finding is further robust to the inclusion of industry, region or year-fixed effects and it also obtains when dropping the crisis years 2007-09 from the sample period (corresponding results not tabulated).
Conclusion
The paper employs a simple structural credit risk model to compare two widely used rating methodologies.
Specifically, the analysis compares the PIT and TTC rating approaches with regards to rating stability and accuracy. Results show that while TTC implied credit ratings are initially more stable, they are prone to rating cliff effects and suffer from an inferior ability to predict future defaults.
Specifically, the problem inherent in the TTC approach relates to the fact that, in a second stage, ratings are typically smoothed and not adjusted immediately. The analysis has shown that this lagged reaction can potentially lead to rating cliff effects, i.e. initially stable ratings are prone to a sudden several notches rating downgrade. Clearly, this abrupt change in the credit rating may lead to a market disruption and dangerous forced selling. When assessing the predictive power of the two rating approaches, one can observe a similar picture. While the PIT approach is always superior in forecasting future defaults, much of the superiority relates to the lagged reaction policy inherent in the TTC approach.
Our simulation study shows that the TTC approach has positive effects on rating stability from an ex-ante point of view, that is as long as the underlying stress scenario has not been breached. During this period, TTC ratings promote rating stability and are only slightly less accurate in predicting future defaults than the PIT approach. However, once current ratings drop below those implied by the TTC approach, the TTC approach becomes prone to procyclical rating cliff effects and it suffers from a clearly inferior ability to predict future defaults. Current discussions on the usefulness of the TTC approach should therefore focus on the reaction to new information once the lower asset value, related to the initial stress scenario, is reached. The implementation of a "through the crisis" approach which has been mentioned by the CRAs themselves, seems to require a more severe stress test ex-ante, but it currently does not address the slow adjustment typically taking place once the cushion built in by a TTC approach is eroded nor the potential cliff effects due to an inefficient smoothing policy.
Our empirical analysis uses a novel and large dataset of bank's internal TTC ratings and thereby disentangles the effect of the TTC rating methodology itself from the documented incentive of CRAs to avoid rating changes (Carey and Hrycay, 2001; Altman and Rijken, 2004; Loeffler, 2004 Loeffler, , 2005 . The data is provided by Global Credit Data Consortium (GCD) and contains TTC ratings of 15 different global 15 banks which are submitted for individual borrowers on (at least) a yearly basis. The final dataset includes as much as 3,382,345 counter-party observations over which the rating migration matrices are observed.
We provide a detailed explanation of the database and our sample in Section 4.
Rating dynamics have been shown to differ across asset classes (Cornaggia et al., 2017) , and we accordingly present all of our findings separately for large corporates, small & medium sized enterprises (SMEs), banks and sovereigns. We report that TTC estimates of default probabilities are consistent across asset classes, yet ratings are most accurate for large corporates and SMEs, whereas the performance is more modest for banks. For sovereigns, actual ratings slightly outperform a random technology. In addition, there is substantial variability in the accuracy of ratings (within asset classes) both over time and across banks and industries. We then explicitly investigate the relation between rating accuracy and stability and show that more stable ratings are on average more accurate. This finding obtains for all four asset classes and is robust to the inclusion of several control variables.
16 Under the PIT approach the credit rating is immediately reduced once the rating of the previous period is breached whereas under the TTC approach CRAs typically follow a smoothing policy. Under the TTC approach ratings will be adjusted (1) if the new rating is at least two notches below the old one and (2) if the change is persistent. The case "TTC switch PIT" shows that the cliff effect will be mitigated in case rating agencies immediately update the rating once the initial stress scenario is breached. The figure shows a 5 notch rating downgrade under the TTC policy in case x * = 2.8 and σ( ) = 0.8. 
where ODF is the observed default frequency, T T C is the forward looking through-the-cycle estimate of default probabilities, region are dummy variables for the geographic region, year are year-dummies and ind are dummy variables for the industry classification. The variable TTC Range displays the difference between the maximum and minimum TTC rating within a rating bucket. The table reports coefficient estimates using the following regression:
where AR is the accuracy ratio, Instab is the standard deviation of all rating changes within a rating portfolio, Class are dummy variables for the asset class, Ind are dummy variables for the industry classification, Region for the geographic region and Y ear are year-dummies. Panel A displays results for the full sample of ARs, Panel B restricts it to those with an AR exceeding the median value. The dataset underlying the computation of AR and Instab is derived as follows. First, at each point in time, we use all assigned credit ratings of a certain lender (for a given asset class within a given industry and for a given geographic region). In total, our dataset includes 78,504 such rating portfolios. ARs can be computed if (1) there is at least one default within a rating portfolio and (2) (1) 
Simulation details
The simulation is performed for different initials values and volatilities of the stochastic process. Specifically, we vary the initial value of the permanent component (x * ) between 1.2 and 5.4 and its volatility σ( ) between 15 percent and 85 percent. Using increments of 0.2 (5 percent) for the permanent component (volatility), this results in a total of 330 different value-volatility combinations. Similar to Loeffler (2004) we assume that the cyclical component (y) has an unconditional mean of zero. We therefore set the starting value of the cyclical component equal to zero and further assume that the volatility of the autoregressive process equals 20 percent. The value of ρ is set to 0.96 and µ is set to zero. 18 We further assume that the TTC methodology imposes a stress scenario on the cyclical component such that with a probability of 20 percent the asset value drops below this threshold. It is assumed that the asset defaults when the (net) asset value drops below zero at the maturity date of the corresponding liability. Finally, all simulations are based on monthly time steps (i.e., dt equals 1/12) for a total period of 5 years and the number of replications equals 10,000. For the TTC methodology, we then assume that the length of the business cycle and forecasting period is 5 years and based on simulated data, we compute corresponding default probabilities which are then mapped into ratings using Moody's 5-year idealized default probabilities.
To sum up, under the TTC approach we first stress-test each asset (i.e. each fundamental valuevolatility combination), compute the corresponding distance-to-default and map this continuous measure into discrete ratings using Moody's 5-year idealized default probabilities. Figure 1 displays the implied rating distribution across the different assets and shows that the TTC approach generates wide dispersion in credit ratings.
For the PIT approach, we assume that the forecast period equals 1 year while leaving all other parameter values unchanged. The rating distribution implied by the PIT approach is based on distanceto-default measures for each asset, i.e. each fundamental value-volatility combination, which are then mapped into discrete ratings using Moody's idealized 1-year default probabilities.
18 The choice of starting values for the fundamental and the cyclical asset value components embeds an implicit assumption that, at the time of the initial rating, one can separate the two value components. While being somewhat extreme, the assumptions reflects the fact that the time of the initial due diligence typically involves a substantial amount of effort and cost.
